Abstract The Food Security Programme in Ethiopia and the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme in Rwanda deliver a combination of consumption support (cash or food transfers, Public Works employment) and livelihood support (asset packages, microfinance) with the objective of 'graduating' rural households out of food insecurity and poverty into self-reliant livelihoods. This article presents perspectives on graduation of influential stakeholders in Ethiopia and Rwanda, and draws conclusions from these case studies for global graduation debates. Our qualitative research reveals a diversity of opinions about the complexity of factors that enable or constrain sustainable graduation. These relate partly to programme design, but also to implementation issues and the different national and subnational economic, political and agroecological contexts within which programmes operate. The alignment of graduation with broader development goals makes investment in these programmes attractive to donors as well as governments, but risks introducing excessive political pressure to demonstrate 'success'.
Introduction
The governments of Ethiopia and Rwanda have introduced programmes that have similarities with the 'graduation model' that was pioneered in Bangladesh in the early 2000s by BRAC, one of the world's largest non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Graduation programmes deliver a sequenced package of consumption and livelihood support to extremely poor households, including cash or food transfers, productive assets such as livestock, access to microfinance (savings and credit) and livelihood training plus life coaching. Evaluations of BRAC's 'Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction' programme have found impressive success rates, with up to 95 per cent of programme participants graduating out of extreme poverty after just 24 months of support (BRAC 2013).
Ethiopia's Food Security Programme (FSP) and Rwanda's Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) share almost identical design features (Table 1) . In both cases, consumption support, delivered either as unconditional cash or food transfers to individuals who are unable to work ('Direct Support'), or as payment for working on community infrastructure projects to individuals who can work ('Public Works'), performs the social protection role of stabilising income and consumption through difficult months or years. These interventions are complemented by livelihood support, delivered either as asset packages in Ethiopia or as low-interest loans for income-generating activities in Rwanda, which aims to raise household income and facilitate sustainable exit from these programmes within 2-5 years.
Graduation is defined in relation to the targeting criteria in each case -chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia (households are eligible if they received food aid in each of the last three years) and 'social poverty' in Rwanda (eligible households are those classified in the bottom two 'Ubudehe' wealth categories by a community ranking exercise) (see Sabates-Wheeler et al., this IDS Bulletin) . In Ethiopia: 'A household has graduated when, in the absence of receiving PSNP [Productive Safety Net Programme] transfers, it can meet its food needs for all 12 months and is able to withstand modest shocks' (FSCB 2007: 1) . 1 In Rwanda: 'Households exit from direct support and public works when they move into Ubudehe category 3 or above and therefore are no longer eligible for direct support transfers or public works wages' (MINALOC 2011: 2) .
To understand the evolving perspectives on graduation in Ethiopia and Rwanda, the authors conducted semi-structured interviews with 38 key stakeholders in both countries. Respondents included government officials involved in policy formulation and programme management, staff from development partners (donor agencies and international financial institutions) who provide financial and technical assistance to these programmes, international or local NGO workers involved in programme or project implementation, and researchers active in programme evaluations. 2 The data presented in this article are the voices of these individuals, in the form of direct quotations transcribed from our interviews.
Research questions included:
Is graduation an appropriate and feasible objective for social protection programmes, or does the emphasis on livelihood 'promotion' risk crowding out the primary emphasis on 'protection'? What are the main 'enablers' and 'constraints' to graduation in the national and subnational contexts where interviewees are working?
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The next two sections of this article address these two questions, before Section 4 concludes.
2 Should graduation be an objective of social protection programmes?
An ongoing debate in the literature questions whether the primary purpose of social protection is to deliver social assistance that alleviates extreme poverty (a social welfare function) or livelihood support that lifts people out of extreme poverty altogether (a poverty reduction function). Barrientos (2010: 2) argues that social protection should serve both objectives: '(i) to help protect basic levels of consumption among those in poverty or in danger of falling into poverty; (ii) to facilitate investment in human and other productive assets which alone can provide escape routes from persistent and intergenerational poverty'. Other commentators put more emphasis on the second function: 'Governments around the world are increasingly focused on the "promotion" function of their social protection systems… Part of the concern is related to the potential dependency on benefits, incentives for beneficiaries to stay or become inactive, and the fiscal cost of the transfer' (Ameida et al. 2012: 2) . These arguments have been criticised as reflecting 'neoliberal' motivations. 'The desire by some governments to "graduate" people from poor relief schemes is directly related to their perception of such schemes as "handouts" and a desire not to create "dependency". Such views are embedded within a neoliberal vision of social policy, which aims to limit investment on social security by exiting people from the system' (Kidd 2013: 3).
We asked stakeholders in Ethiopia and Rwanda for their views. Should graduation be an objective of social protection programmes at all? The dominant view in both countries seems to be that comprehensive social protection should perform both 'livelihood protection' and 'livelihood promotion' functions. Within this broad consensus, however, a number of more nuanced positions can be discerned, ranging from those aligned with 'neoliberal' values (avoid dependency, minimise spending) through to a less frequently articulated 'social justice' perspective (graduation contradicts the right to social protection), with the 'twin-track' view falling in the middle (graduation is possible for some, but permanent social assistance is essential for others). An increasing concern for development partners is to achieve 'value for money' from their aid spending, in terms of measurable and attributable impacts of the programmes they support. Building graduation targets into programme design provides a benchmark against which progress can be measured. It also provides an end-date for financial support to these programmes. Graduation demonstrates 'successful' interventions by governments, donors and NGOs, and justifies the relatively high levels of spending on these programmes. This is politically beneficial for governments as well as their development partners.
Politically, graduation makes social protection palatable (Development partner, Rwanda). This 'twin-track' approach is reflected in the design of the FSP in Ethiopia and VUP in Rwanda. Both programmes provide Public Works employment, assets and microcredit to poor households with labour capacity, and unconditional cash transfers to poor households with negligible labour capacity.
Several respondents in both countries also pointed out that graduation was never expected to be achieved through cash or food transfers alone. Graduation can only be achieved through a holistic 'package' of interventions. One of the biggest challenges identified to sustainable graduation, in both countries, is that participants typically graduate 'out of ' the FSP and VUP, instead of 'into' other programmes. The lack of complementary programmes post-graduation increases the likelihood that 'graduates' will fall back to pre-graduation levels. Even if graduation is accepted as a valid objective for social protection, there is some concern that an increasing preoccupation with graduating or 'exiting' participants out of social protection programmes could detract attention from their primary purpose, which is 'protection' rather than 'promotion' -in other words, that the secondary objective is becoming the primary objective. A government official from Rwanda denied that this is a risk, since graduation and safety nets are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Safety nets will persist while graduation programmes will help beneficiaries to reduce their reliance on them by increasing their assets and accessing markets.
The graduation component is added to the safety net to ensure there is a progressive trend taking place. The objective of social protection is not graduation, it is to protect those households who are in poverty, but the graduation component is a stimulus to those who can get out (Government official, Rwanda).

Graduation enablers and constraints
The questionnaire designed for the qualitative research asked interviewees to identify and explain the factors that facilitate or inhibit graduation in Ethiopia and Rwanda, drawing on a typology of 'enablers and constraints' developed by Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2013) . Their framework disaggregates determinants of graduation into five categories or levels, four of which are examined here: programme, market, environment and beneficiary. Instead of the fifth category -community -we added the political level, since incentives or disincentives at the political level to push for a graduation agenda strongly affect graduation outcomes in both countries. This section presents stakeholders' narratives on enablers and constraints to graduation at these various levels.
Programme level
The design features and implementation modalities of graduation programmes are crucial determinants of their outcomes. In terms of programme design, it was recognised that the amounts of cash or food transferred by the PSNP and VUP are not large enough for participants to graduate in either case. Budget constraints were given as the reason why payments have not been raised to enhance graduation potential. 
Market and environmental levels
At the market level, it was acknowledged that programme participants need to have access to well-functioning markets if they are to grow their incomes, yet the rural economy is not sufficiently developed in either Ethiopia or Rwanda. In terms of environmental constraints, difficult agroecological conditions and an erratic climate, especially in Ethiopia, undermine the productivity of agriculture and related livelihood activities, and discourage investment in enterprises that could be devastated by drought. For this reason, the wider context -in this case, rural infrastructure and the natural resource base -is crucial for graduation potential. It is unrealistic to expect programmes such as the FSP or VUP to create the favourable enabling context required.
There are many factors outside of the programme that really affect the outcomes. Market linkages and access to inputs really affects them, access to information, even infrastructure. Some of the beneficiaries live in very remote areas. Having a graduation type of model, will it work in that context when they are very isolated from the society? If you design a graduation or livelihood diversification programme it has to look at the context (Development partner, Ethiopia).
Weak markets and rural poverty create a risky environment for introducing new livelihood options, or for rapidly expanding the scale of local income-generating activities. The challenge of limited demand for rural produce was faced when the HABP promoted honey production in Ethiopia, and when tomato production expanded in Rwanda.
People's innovative capacity is low, so what often happens is that people copy each other and this affects the market. One person starts growing tomatoes and everyone else in the village does the same, then they flood the market and the price collapses, so next season they leave tomatoes and all try something else
(Government official, Rwanda).
Beneficiary level
Stakeholder perceptions of beneficiary-specific enablers and constraints reflect two contrasting narratives. The first assumes that beneficiaries want to graduate, but lack the necessary attributes or resources to do so. The second challenges the assumption that graduation is a desirable objective for beneficiaries, asserting instead that they will try to stay in the programme and avoid being 'graduated' so as not to lose their benefits. In both countries women and female-headed households were considered to be performing disappointingly in terms of graduation. Graduation from Ethiopia's FSP is meant to happen by combining PSNP with HABP, but the HABP fails to promote activities that are likely to be undertaken by female-headed households, since these either require land ownership or promote labour-intensive activities that are better suited to men.
Beneficiaries want to graduate but lack confidence and resources to do so
In Rwanda, survey evidence revealed that women and female-headed households were less likely to graduate from the VUP than men and maleheaded households, leading to speculation about the reasons for this gender-differentiated outcome.
One suggestion was that women invest the VUP money in the nutrition and education of their children -they invest in the family's immediate needs -but the men buy a cow or some pigs and start to generate more income, so after a year or two they are ready to leave the VUP while the woman still needs help to feed her family (Government official, Rwanda).
There are also gender differences in terms of women's ability to take up opportunities, related to their heavier burden of care in the household and their limited control over resources -income and assets -within families (Development partner, Rwanda).
However, these adverse gendered outcomes are not inevitable. In other graduation projects, notably those in Bangladesh, women receive livelihood support that is designed around more gender-appropriate income-generating activities, and they perform considerably better.
Beneficiaries don't want to graduate because they want to keep their benefits
Contradicting the official narrative that participants are enthusiastic to graduate out of poverty and food insecurity, development partners, researchers and civil society representatives in Ethiopia and Rwanda conceded that many PSNP and VUP participants prefer not to graduate, since being in these programmes provides them with a regular income, subsidised or free access to services and a safety net that they do not want to lose.
From a development perspective graduation sounds good, but for the beneficiaries it is not good! Because they lose all their benefits (Development partner, Rwanda).
There is a huge benefit to being labelled category 1 or 2. You get VUP, you get 'mutuelle de santé', you get free education. As soon as you move to category 3 you lose all of this (Development partner, Rwanda).
Incentives to stay in the programme as long as possible are equally strong in the Ethiopian context, with its long history of disasters and food insecurity. Some participants apparently make strategic decisions to ensure that they will stay in the PSNP, like selling their assets before a graduation assessment is done, then buying them back afterwards.
Nobody wants to graduate. For me the PSNP is an insurance for everyone. As long as there are climate risks and disasters, people want to be part of this insurance. So these farmers want to be in the programme forever, and you have to save them from this dependency syndrome (Researcher, Ethiopia).
Political level
The graduation programmes in Ethiopia and Rwanda are high profile and enjoy political support from the highest level. This is generally considered as a positive factor, since it ensures that these programmes are prioritised by government officials and receive the administrative, technical and financial resources they require to operate effectively. On the other hand, with political support also comes political pressure to demonstrate success.
Stakeholders interviewed in Ethiopia acknowledged that the political discourse surrounding the PSNP equates high numbers of graduated participants with programme success. This has created an incentive structure among civil servants and local officials that favours rapid -even potentially 'premature' -graduation.
Politics trump evidence. So the need to deliver on political targets will trump the evidence of what is possible. The incentive is actually not to make households graduate sustainably, the incentive is to tick a box: 'Yes, we have achieved that target' (Development partner, Ethiopia).
While some perceived that premature graduation was caused by political pressure, others argued that it was the result of miscommunication concerning graduation targets between higher administrative levels and woreda (district) officials. While the federal level and the regions saw graduation figures as recommendations or guidelines, woredas interpreted these as rigid quotas.
The federal level gives 'guidance numbers' for how many people should be graduated, but at woreda level they translate it as a quota, as something that has to happen. Even if not obligatory from above they are perceived as being obligatory from below. That has affected the whole sustainability issue (Development partner, Ethiopia).
As a consequence, it is impossible to calculate how many PSNP ex-participants have genuinely surpassed the graduation thresholds and how many have been 'exited' from the programme due to a 'systematic coercion to graduate people'.
Political pressure and graduation targets also create perverse financial incentives at the woreda level. On the one hand, achieving high graduation rates is associated with being a 'successful' woreda. On the other hand, local officials have little incentive to graduate people from the PSNP, as this will reduce the budget that the woreda receives from the programme when participant numbers fall. This puts them in an anomalous position, where success is 'punished' with losing funds.
The woredas are essentially reliant on the PSNP for administrative recurrent budgets, so what is the incentive of the administration to actually deliver the programme effectively? So you enter into these really perverse incentives that undermine the integrity of the programme (Development partner, Ethiopia).
After the PSNP's first five-year cycle, when only limited graduation had been achieved, it was acknowledged that the initial graduation targets or quotas were too ambitious, and they were relaxed during the second phase. Nonetheless, expectations around graduation remain high. One of the authors participated in a workshop in Addis Ababa where a senior government official complained: 'The PSNP has failed. We are supposed to be graduating millions of people and instead we just see the numbers of beneficiaries increasing every year.' Rwanda seems to be following the opposite trajectory to Ethiopia. In Rwanda, graduation was not initially a political imperative. Although the VUP was expected to contribute to national poverty reduction goals, it was seen as just one intervention among many. Programme managers in government were sympathetic about the challenges poor people face, and they were realistic about what could be achieved. (Government official, Rwanda) .
Because the government of Rwanda has a strong commitment to poverty reduction, and because the VUP was seen as a successful and popular social protection programme, the 2nd Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS-2) highlights the VUP, and the Social Protection Sector Strategy has an annex with target numbers to be graduated from the VUP for the next five years. Of course, a more prominent place for graduation on the policy agenda through the EDPRS-2 also increases the pressure to deliver results, which could lead to similar adverse consequences as in Ethiopia, if not treated with caution. 
Conclusion
The interviews we conducted in Ethiopia and Rwanda confirmed that the position different actors take on the appropriate functions of social protection programmes often reflects their ideological perspective -crudely, whether they see social protection as a temporary safety net linked to a poverty reduction agenda, or if they see social protection as a permanent feature of social policy and a tool for achieving social justice. We draw conclusions from our research at the conceptual, operational, strategic and political levels.
Conceptually, many stakeholders saw no contradiction between the 'protection' and 'promotion' functions of social protection. The consensus opinion was that it is possible to put in place a safety net against poverty and simultaneously graduate people out of poverty, using a toolkit of complementary instruments. Stakeholders who emphasise growth and poverty reduction outcomes see graduation as an imperative: programmes should set targets for 'exiting' participants off social assistance, and if these targets are not achieved the programme has failed. Conversely, stakeholders who assign an intrinsic value to guaranteeing a minimum subsistence to all poor and vulnerable citizens and residents at all times are more concerned with establishing a comprehensive and sustainable social welfare system, and ensuring that an effective safety net is installed against future shocks.
Operationally, the tension between 'protection' and 'promotion' objectives has been resolved in both Ethiopia and Rwanda by a bifurcated 'twintrack' approach -providing differentiated support to different population sub-groups, depending on their perceived 'graduation potential': long-term social assistance for poor people with limited graduation potential, short-term social assistance plus livelihood support to poor people who are expected to become self-reliant if they receive an appropriate package of productive resources that includes assets, training and access to microfinance. In other words, social protection should provide a permanent safety net for some and an opportunity to graduate out of poverty for others. One key implication for the design and implementation of graduation programmes is that a careful analysis is needed of the 'enablers' and 'constraints' to graduation in each context -there is no blueprint 'graduation model' that can be applied with equal probability of success across very different countries, regions and livelihood systems.
One strategic challenge identified by many stakeholders is to shift expectations away from seeing social protection programmes like the FSP and VUP as instruments for achieving food security and poverty reduction in their own right, towards locating these programmes in a sequenced suite of support provided to poor and vulnerable people. The policy implication is that graduation should be implemented not in terms of 'exiting out of ' all social protection programmes but rather by 'graduating into' complementary social and economic programmes. Some donor agency representatives argued for introducing or strengthening mechanisms that allow programme participants to move smoothly from informal to formal social protection (in other words, from social assistance to social security) or from informal to formal employment (from public works to selfemployment to wage-earning jobs). Only if opportunities for these transitions are built into social protection interventions will sustainable graduation be possible.
Finally, it is often argued that social protection programmes need strong political support to attract the resources they need, but in the case of graduation programmes the challenge is sometimes not too little political support, but too much. Political pressure can compromise rather than promote genuine and sustainable graduation outcomes, and there is a risk that unrealistic expectations can cause political support to wane if large-scale graduation is not achieved within a relatively short time frame. Typically, there is more political support for graduation programmes than for safety nets, with government officials expressing concerns about the fiscal affordability of permanent programmes and about encouraging 'dependency' rather than self-reliance. Politicians and bureaucrats need to be convinced that a permanent, comprehensive social protection system is a positive symbol of progress and development, and that graduation is a realistic objective only for part of the eligible population. 
Notes
